# Elaichi alternatives: an honest list by situation

> An honest list of Elaichi alternatives by situation: native connectors, Zapier MCP, Composio, Merge Agent Handler, Mintive, Glean and self-hosted servers.

**TL;DR** The honest list of Elaichi alternatives sorts by situation, not by feature count. Native Claude and ChatGPT connectors are enough for a few apps from one vendor, search platforms suit retrieval over unstructured knowledge, broad automation catalogs suit sheer app count, and self-hosting suits a gateway that must sit in your own network. Elaichi is the pick when Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor and Microsoft Copilot all need one governed address with one audit log behind it.

## Why a list of Elaichi alternatives has to start with the situation

The right choice depends on what you are trying to fix. It does not depend on which product has the longest feature table. An IT lead with four Google Workspace apps and twelve people has one problem. A security architect with Salesforce, Jira, Zendesk and Snowflake has another. That estate covers four hundred people and three AI clients.

So this list of Elaichi alternatives is sorted by situation. Each section names the case where that option is the better pick. Each one also says plainly what you give up.

A note on sourcing before the table. Every claim below about a competitor comes from that vendor's own pages. That means its documentation, help center or marketing site, with a URL and a checked date attached. None of it is independent testing. Where a vendor's own pages disagree with each other, that disagreement is flagged in the text. Glean and Composio both do this on connector counts. Treat each figure as what the vendor states about itself, not as a verified benchmark.

| Situation | Where to look |
| --- | --- |
| One AI client, two or three apps from one vendor | The apps' own connectors |
| Finding what somebody wrote, across everything | Glean |
| Reaching the largest number of apps | Zapier MCP |
| Building your own agent in code | Composio |
| Inspecting payloads before a call runs | Merge Agent Handler |
| Fronting MCP servers somebody else wrote | Mintive |
| A gateway that must run in your own network | A self-hosted MCP server |
| Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor and Microsoft Copilot on one governed address | Elaichi |

Two pieces of vocabulary first, used throughout. MCP (Model Context Protocol) is the standard way an AI assistant calls tools in other apps. Everything else in this list builds on two more terms. An endpoint is the single HTTPS address a client points at. A grant is the OAuth authorization one person gives one client. The grant decides what that client can reach. Some products use one endpoint per org, per team or per role instead. That difference is called out explicitly below. It changes what breaks when a person changes teams.

## When you need one governed endpoint for Claude, ChatGPT and Cursor: Elaichi

Elaichi fits when several AI clients need the same governed reach into the same apps. One set of rules and one audit log sit behind all of them. It serves MCP at one address, https://api.elaichi.ai/mcp, the same string for every organization. Which organization, person and tools a client reaches comes from the OAuth grant behind its token, not from the URL.

That shape has a practical consequence. Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor and Microsoft Copilot all sign into the same address. There is no per-client URL, no per-team URL and no per-person URL to create, list or revoke. Each person connects their client once and approves their own grant. They list those grants under Settings, then Connected apps.

The catalog behind that address holds 650+ connectors of two kinds. Most are connectors Elaichi authors and runs itself. The rest are native MCP connectors. There, the vendor builds and runs its own MCP server, and Elaichi handles sign-in, access and audit in front of it. A team on Gold can also bring its own remote MCP server under the same rules. Elaichi does not author every connector it serves, and saying otherwise would be wrong.

Governance sits in three layers. Permissions say what a role lets a member do. Sharing says who may use a given connection, toolbox or template. Restrictions say which connectors and tools a role or a member may reach. In Elaichi, restriction targets are role or user only; the organization default is the absence of a rule, which means allow everything. One honest caution. A role, team or restriction change takes effect within about two minutes. Do not treat a saved restriction as an immediate kill switch. Revocation has its own timing too: removing or suspending a member revokes every live grant in the same transaction as the membership change. [Roles, Restrictions and ACLs in MCP](/blog/roles-restrictions-acls-three-mechanics/) separates the three properly.

On audit, most comparisons skip the mechanics entirely. So here is what one audit log row actually contains. In Elaichi, one entry for each connected-tool call that reaches execution (a call refused earlier writes none). The row records no argument names and no argument count. It does record the value of the one path argument that names the object, stored as the target id. Elaichi keeps 90 days of audit history. For longer, forward it to your own log service, which comes with the Black plan.

**Where Elaichi loses, stated plainly, in one place:**

- It is a hosted service. If the gateway must run inside your own network, this is not the answer; a self-hosted MCP server is.
- The MCP endpoint itself has no prompt-injection defense. That defense is an injection scan plus a second-model write gate. It exists only in the in-app Elaichi Agent, which comes with the Black plan. On the MCP endpoint, defending against injected instructions is the client's job, not Elaichi's.
- Audit retention is 90 days by default. Anything longer requires forwarding to an external log service. That is a Black-plan feature, not a default.
- APAC organizations get best-effort data placement, not a residency guarantee. The audit-log store itself is a single EU instance. It serves all regions regardless of org region.
- Restrictions target a role or one named member. There is no org-wide or team-wide restriction target. Broad lockdowns therefore require a role restructure, or restricting every relevant role individually.
- Role, team and restriction changes propagate within about two minutes. Build that lag into any incident-response plan.

## When your main problem is search over unstructured knowledge: Glean

Glean is the better pick when the question is "find the thing somebody wrote". It is the wrong pick when the question is "do the thing in the app". Its enterprise search page calls Glean Search "AI-powered workplace search". The same page says results are real-time and permissions-aware, so everyone sees only what they should ([Glean](https://www.glean.com/enterprise-search), checked October 2026).

Glean's Remote MCP Server page says the server is tenant-specific and permission-aware. It says each person uses their own Glean access. It adds that administrators can disable MCP or hide the end-user Configurator ([Glean](https://developers.glean.com/guides/mcp), checked October 2026). Its agent governance page says Glean enforces permissions for every action an agent takes. The same page says admins can define how broadly agents are shared ([Glean](https://www.glean.com/ai-agents/agent-governance), checked October 2026). Its connectors page describes 275-plus out-of-the-box connectors. It also describes human-in-the-loop controls that require approval before execution ([Glean](https://www.glean.com/platform/connectors), checked October 2026). Glean's own pages give different connector counts in different places. So quote the figure with the page it came from, not as a single fixed number.

Say your team's real complaint is that nobody can find the runbook, the policy or the last customer email. That is a retrieval problem. Elaichi is built for the other half. It runs a named tool in a named app as a named person, with a rule in front of it. The two are not substitutes for each other.

The corpus has a longer treatment of the overlap in [Glean or connect apps to Claude and ChatGPT?](/blog/glean-or-connect-apps-to-claude-and-chatgpt/). [Glean alternatives that act in your apps](/blog/glean-alternatives/) covers the acting side.

## When catalog size is the whole decision: Zapier MCP

Zapier MCP is genuinely the right answer when one factor decides it. That factor is how many apps you can reach. Zapier's help article says Zapier MCP gives an AI access to 9,000-plus apps and 40,000-plus actions. Zapier handles app connections, credentials and rate limits ([Zapier](https://help.zapier.com/hc/en-us/articles/48308034391821-What-is-Zapier-MCP), checked October 2026). That page lists Zapier MCP as available on the Free, Professional, Team and Enterprise plans.

The unit of ownership is the server, not the address. Zapier's docs say several of a person's MCP clients can connect to the same MCP server. They then use the same apps, actions and skills. Each client connects to the same endpoint, https://mcp.zapier.com/api/v1/connect ([Zapier](https://docs.zapier.com/mcp/overview/how-connections-work), checked October 2026). Zapier's rollout page says a rollout changes what members can reach, not how they connect. Each member still signs in and runs tool calls as themselves ([Zapier](https://docs.zapier.com/mcp/get-started/rollout/overview), checked October 2026).

On governance, Zapier's security page says MCP enforces app and action restrictions automatically. Those restrictions are set at the Zapier account level. The same page says the History tab shows activity logs of tool calls per user ([Zapier](https://docs.zapier.com/mcp/manage/security), checked October 2026). It also says app and action restrictions are not currently configurable for Zapier MCP alone. A restriction applies account-wide across Zapier features. That last line is the one to weigh. Say you need a rule that applies to AI access and not to the rest of the Zapier account. Read that line carefully before committing a whole team's automation to the same account. [Zapier MCP alternative for a whole company](/blog/zapier-mcp-alternative/) goes further into the comparison.

## When your team is building an agent in code: Composio

Composio is the better pick when the thing being built is your own application. It is a weaker pick for a rollout of off-the-shelf clients. Its docs home says Composio gives agents "tools, managed authentication, and secure execution across 1,700+ apps" ([Composio](https://docs.composio.dev/docs), checked November 2026). Its homepage says Composio Platform supports per-user connected accounts. Those cover agents, backend jobs and application-owned tools ([Composio](https://composio.dev/), checked November 2026). Its Enterprise page counts 1,500-plus managed app integrations ([Composio](https://composio.dev/enterprise), checked November 2026). That is a lower figure than the docs page. Flag that cross-page inconsistency rather than averaging it away.

Composio is not short on governance. Its MCP Gateway page gives each team its own MCP endpoint, one URL per team. Each endpoint is scoped to the tools that team is permitted to use. SSO verifies the user before any tool resolves ([Composio](https://composio.dev/mcp-gateway), checked November 2026). The same page says tool-call payloads are not stored. It says audit records hold metadata, and that the retention window is configurable from 7 days to 1 year. Its Enterprise page offers SAML and OIDC single sign-on with Okta, Microsoft Entra ID and Google Workspace. It adds SCIM 2.0 mapping directory groups to teams ([Composio](https://composio.dev/enterprise), checked November 2026).

The architectural difference is the endpoint shape, not a governance gap. Composio documents one URL per team ([Composio](https://composio.dev/mcp-gateway), checked November 2026). Elaichi documents one address for every organization, with the grant deciding reach. Which you prefer depends on what you would rather maintain. A URL list means a new team brings a new URL, and a disbanded team leaves one to retire. A grant list means a new person brings a new grant, and a leaver's grant is revoked. [Elaichi vs Composio](/blog/elaichi-vs-composio/) works through the connector-authorship side of the same question. [MCP endpoint per team, per person or per company?](/blog/one-endpoint-vs-per-team-endpoint/) takes the endpoint shape apart.

Whichever platform you pick on catalog size, test one thing. Test how deeply it lets you restrict individual methods inside one application. A broad catalog and fine-grained [per-tool rules](/blog/per-tool-vs-per-app-restrictions/) are different capabilities. A large connector count does not imply you can scope down to one method inside one connector.

## When payload inspection before execution is the requirement: Merge Agent Handler

Merge Agent Handler fits when the security requirement is inspection of what crosses the wire. Merge's Agent Handler FAQ says IT and security teams get SCIM-based provisioning. They also get policy guardrails and DLP on every tool call, plus a searchable audit trail ([Merge](https://www.merge.dev/merge-agent-handler), checked November 2026). The same FAQ says audit logs are available on all plans. It says individuals install it as a remote MCP server and create Tool Packs. It says it is free to start with usage-based pricing. DLP here means data loss prevention. That is scanning the content of a request before it leaves, not just logging that the request happened.

The same FAQ describes Agent Handler as a platform for securely connecting AI agents to enterprise tools at scale. It names production-grade connectors, built-in authentication and observability tooling ([Merge](https://www.merge.dev/merge-agent-handler), checked October 2026). Three things are not documented on that page. They are the endpoint pattern for Agent Handler connectors, the exact connector count, and which connectors Merge itself authors versus partners. Those remain open questions to put to Merge directly.

Elaichi's nearest equivalent control is narrower. Here it is precisely, so the comparison is fair. Elaichi scrubs secret-shaped values from tool results before they leave. It replaces values under keys named like api_key, password or access_token. It also replaces strings that look like bearer tokens or JWTs. The product code calls that defense in depth behind the credential vault, not a security boundary. It does nothing against prompt injection. It does nothing to inspect outbound payload content beyond secret-shaped strings. Say payload inspection is the control you need. If that means actual content-level DLP on every call rather than secret-scrubbing, that is Merge Agent Handler's case rather than Elaichi's ([Merge](https://www.merge.dev/merge-agent-handler), checked November 2026). [Merge Agent Handler alternatives for employee AI](/blog/elaichi-vs-merge-agent-handler/) has the fuller comparison.

## When you want to wrap servers somebody else wrote: Mintive

Mintive, formerly MintMCP, fits one plan in particular. That plan is putting existing MCP servers behind one managed front door, rather than adopting a connector catalog. Its gateway page calls the product "The MCP gateway between your agents and your systems." The same page says a company can publish an internal catalog of approved servers. It adds that a company can host its own custom servers behind the company's SSO. It also says a company can group servers into one endpoint per role ([Mintive](https://www.mintive.com/mcp-gateway), checked November 2026).

On audit, the same page says every client connects through the same endpoint. Every call is therefore logged at the gateway. The log carries the user, the tool, the server it reached, and what the guardrail did with the request. Its homepage lists SSO via SAML and OIDC plus centralized credential management. It also lists EU and US data residency, and export to a SIEM or streaming via OTLP ([Mintive](https://www.mintive.com/), checked November 2026). Its gateway FAQ says it is managed in the US or the EU. VPC and self-hosted deployments are available on request ([Mintive](https://www.mintive.com/mcp-gateway), checked November 2026).

The endpoint difference matters in a rollout. One endpoint per role means the URL a person pastes encodes their role. So a role change can mean a new URL to distribute ([Mintive](https://www.mintive.com/mcp-gateway), checked November 2026). One address for everyone means the grant carries the role instead. A role change then needs no new URL. Neither is wrong; they put the maintenance work in different places. Mintive's model pushes it into URL distribution. Elaichi's pushes it into grant management. [MintMCP alternatives for employee AI access](/blog/mintmcp-alternative/) covers the rest.

## When the gateway has to run in your own network: self-hosted MCP servers

Self-hosting is the honest answer in one case. That case is a contract, a regulator or a network boundary saying the gateway runs on infrastructure you control. Nothing a hosted vendor writes about residency changes that requirement. Residency commitments on a hosted product are a promise about where data sits. They are not a transfer of control over the infrastructure.

Several vendors document this shape. Lunar.dev's FAQ says MCPX is fully self-hosted, running entirely inside the customer's infrastructure. It is deployed locally with Docker or in a Kubernetes cluster using the Helm chart ([Lunar.dev](https://www.lunar.dev/), checked November 2026). Docker's MCP Gateway page calls it Docker's open source solution for orchestrating MCP servers. The same page describes it as a centralized proxy between clients and servers. That proxy manages configuration, credentials and access control ([Docker](https://docs.docker.com/ai/mcp-catalog-and-toolkit/mcp-gateway/), checked November 2026). The docker/mcp-gateway repository states the project is licensed under the MIT License ([Docker](https://github.com/docker/mcp-gateway), checked November 2026).

What self-hosting removes is a license fee and a third party in the data path. What it adds is the OAuth layer and the role and restriction model. It also adds the audit pipeline and its retention, the connector maintenance, and somebody on call for all of it. That is a team's ongoing engineering work, not a one-week project. Budget for it as you would for any internally-run auth and logging system. That is what it is. [Self-hosted MCP servers vs a managed MCP platform](/blog/self-hosted-mcp-servers-vs-control-plane/) and [MCP data residency: self-hosted vs managed](/blog/self-hosting-mcp-for-data-residency/) take the trade-off apart properly.

Elaichi has three regions, EU, US and APAC. The region is chosen when the organization is created and cannot be changed afterwards. An EU or US organization's data store is pinned to that jurisdiction. APAC uses best-effort placement, which is not a residency guarantee. Elaichi's [privacy policy](/privacy/) says the audit-log store is one EU instance serving all regions. Say your requirement is stricter than that. If audit data must never leave a specific jurisdiction, self-host instead.

## When the honest answer is that you need none of these

Say your company uses two or three apps from one vendor and one AI client. The vendor's own connectors are probably enough. On Claude Team and Enterprise plans, an Owner or Primary Owner adds a custom connector. They do it from Organization settings, then Connectors, and each member then connects individually ([Anthropic](https://support.claude.com/en/articles/11175166-get-started-with-custom-connectors-using-remote-mcp), checked October 2026). OpenAI says custom MCP server connections and full MCP support are available on ChatGPT web. That covers ChatGPT Business and Enterprise and Edu customers. On that plan, admins and owners create and publish the plugins ([OpenAI](https://help.openai.com/en/articles/12584461-connecting-custom-mcp-servers-in-chatgpt), checked October 2026). Cursor reads MCP servers from a project file or one in the home directory. It supports OAuth for servers that require it ([Cursor](https://cursor.com/docs/mcp), checked October 2026).

Most apps now ship their own MCP server too. Notion, HubSpot, Slack, Atlassian, Ramp, ClickUp, Gusto and BambooHR each publish one. Each runs under that app's own permission model. It reads and writes only what the authorizing user can already access there ([Notion](https://developers.notion.com/guides/mcp/overview) and [HubSpot](https://developers.hubspot.com/changelog/remote-hubspot-mcp-server-is-now-generally-available), checked October 2026). If one app covers your use case and one client covers your people, point the client at the vendor's server and stop. There is no governance gain from adding a gateway in front of a single connector that one client reaches.

The cost arrives when the counts go up. Say engineering uses Cursor, sales uses ChatGPT and operations uses Claude. Native connectors then mean credential management, approval settings and audit evidence in three separate consoles. Each console has its own export format and its own retention policy. A control plane earns its place at that point. The conditions are several apps, several clients, and a rule that has to hold across all of them. You also need one place to answer who did what, in which app, through which client. [When you don't need an MCP gateway yet](/blog/when-you-dont-need-an-mcp-gateway/) is the longer version of this argument. [Claude and ChatGPT Enterprise connectors vs an MCP gateway](/blog/elaichi-vs-native-ai-connectors/) compares the two paths directly.

## How to run the comparison

Four questions settle most of these decisions.

How many AI clients will people use? One client means the vendor's own connectors are a serious option. Three or more means one governed address starts paying for itself.

Is the job retrieval or action? Searching across everything people wrote is [enterprise search's shape](/blog/elaichi-vs-glean/). Running a named tool in Salesforce or Stripe is a control plane's shape.

How many apps, and whose? A fragmented estate across many vendors favors catalog size. A handful of apps favors the apps' own servers.

Who runs the gateway? If it must be your network, self-host and budget the engineering. If a hosted service is acceptable, compare what each one records and how long it keeps it. Then run the same questions past each vendor with the [MCP gateway security checklist](/blog/mcp-security-review-checklist/).

**Governance and infrastructure, side by side.** All figures below are as stated on each vendor's own page, cited above. Nothing here is independently verified behavior.

| Product | Endpoint model | Audit retention | Payload inspection | Data residency | SSO / identity | Catalog size (vendor-stated) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Elaichi | One address for every org; grant decides reach | 90 days default; forward to own log service on Black | Secret-string scrubbing only (defense in depth, not a boundary); no prompt-injection defense on the endpoint itself | EU/US pinned at org creation; APAC best-effort; audit-log store is one EU instance for all regions | OAuth grant per person, per client | 650+ connectors |
| Glean | Tenant-specific MCP server | Not stated on cited pages | Human-in-the-loop approval before execution | Not stated on cited pages | Permission-aware per user | 275+ (connectors page; other Glean pages give different figures) |
| Zapier MCP | One shared server per person; single endpoint URL | History tab per-user activity log; retention not stated | Account-level app/action restrictions (not MCP-specific; applies account-wide) | Not stated on cited pages | Account-level sign-in per member | 9,000+ apps / 40,000+ actions |
| Composio | One MCP endpoint per team | Metadata only; configurable 7 days to 1 year | Tool-call payloads not stored | Not stated on cited pages | SAML/OIDC SSO (Okta, Entra ID, Google Workspace) + SCIM 2.0 | 1,700+ (docs) / 1,500+ (enterprise page) |
| Merge Agent Handler | Remote MCP server, individually-created Tool Packs | Searchable audit trail, all plans | Policy guardrails + DLP on every tool call | Not stated on cited pages | SCIM-based provisioning | Not stated on cited pages |
| Mintive | One endpoint per role | Logged at gateway: user, tool, server, guardrail action | Guardrail action logged; inspection mechanism not detailed | EU and US residency; VPC/self-hosted on request | SAML/OIDC SSO, centralized credentials | Wraps existing MCP servers (no fixed catalog count) |
| Self-hosted (e.g. Docker MCP Gateway, Lunar MCPX) | Fully inside customer infrastructure | Whatever you build | Whatever you build | Full control, by definition | Whatever you build | Whatever you connect |

On pricing: Zapier MCP is available on its Free, Professional, Team and Enterprise tiers. Composio and Merge Agent Handler both describe usage-based or free-to-start pricing with paid enterprise tiers. Elaichi has three plans. They are Personal, free for one person, plus Gold and Black. Elaichi's prompt-injection scan exists only in the in-app Elaichi Agent, which comes with Black, and export to your own Datadog comes with the Black plan. None of the vendors compared here publish directly comparable per-seat figures on the pages cited. Treat plan names as a starting point for a sales conversation, not as a settled cost comparison. [MCP gateway pricing](/blog/mcp-gateway-pricing/) tracks what public pricing exists in more detail.

For the wider market view, [Best MCP gateways in 2026](/blog/best-mcp-gateways/) sets out the landscape. If you want to see the Elaichi side rather than read about it, start with the [connector catalog](/connectors/) and [use cases](/use-cases/). Current trial terms: 14-day Black trial, no credit card to start. Buying Gold or Black during the trial keeps its remaining days rather than granting a fresh 14, so it is one continuous trial, and the seats are first charged when it ends. A workspace that buys nothing moves to the free Personal plan.

## FAQ

### What are the main alternatives to Elaichi for giving employees AI access to company apps?

The realistic set is: native connectors inside Claude and ChatGPT, each app's own MCP server, broad automation catalogs such as Zapier MCP, developer platforms such as Composio, managed platforms such as Merge Agent Handler and Mintive, search platforms such as Glean, and self-hosted MCP servers where the gateway must run on your own infrastructure. Which one fits depends on how many AI clients your people use, whether the job is retrieval or action, and whether a hosted service is acceptable.

### Does Elaichi give each team or each person its own MCP URL?

No. Elaichi serves MCP at one address, https://api.elaichi.ai/mcp, and that string is the same for every organization. Which organization, person and tools a client reaches comes from the OAuth grant behind its token, not from the URL. Each person still connects their client once and approves their own grant, which they can list and disconnect under Settings, then Connected apps. Some other gateways take the opposite approach: Mintive's gateway page describes grouping servers into one endpoint per role ([Mintive](https://www.mintive.com/mcp-gateway), checked November 2026).

### How quickly does a permission change take effect in Elaichi?

A role change, team-membership change, restriction change or access-grant change takes effect within about two minutes, because effective permissions are cached briefly and the cache invalidation has to reach every location. Revoking an OAuth grant, removing or suspending a member, revoking a share and disconnecting an account are different: those are effective on the client's very next call, because every request re-reads the grant and the connection.

### Does an AI agent audit log record the arguments of each tool call?

In Elaichi, not in general. In Elaichi, one entry for each connected-tool call that reaches execution (a call refused earlier writes none). The row records no argument names and no argument count. It does record the value of the one path argument that names the object, stored as the target id.

### When should a company skip a control plane and use the app's own MCP server instead?

When one AI client covers the people and one or two apps cover the use case. Notion, HubSpot, Slack, Atlassian, Ramp, ClickUp, Gusto and BambooHR each publish their own MCP server, and each runs under that app's permission model, reaching only what the authorizing user can already access there ([Notion](https://developers.notion.com/guides/mcp/overview) and [HubSpot](https://developers.hubspot.com/changelog/remote-hubspot-mcp-server-is-now-generally-available), checked October 2026). A control plane earns its place once several apps, several AI clients and a rule that must hold across all of them are in play, together with one place to answer who did what, in which app, through which client.

### Do self-hosted MCP servers come with authentication and audit logging?

Not by default. Self-hosting removes a license fee and keeps a third party out of the data path, but the OAuth layer, the role and restriction model, the audit pipeline and its retention, the connector maintenance and the on-call rotation become your team's ongoing work. Docker's MCP Gateway page describes its open source gateway as a centralized proxy managing configuration, credentials and access control, which is a starting point rather than a finished governance layer ([Docker](https://docs.docker.com/ai/mcp-catalog-and-toolkit/mcp-gateway/), checked November 2026).

## Read next

- [Composio alternatives with governance and audit logs](/blog/composio-alternatives/) — Composio alternatives with stronger governance and audit logs: Elaichi, Merge, Arcade, Runlayer and Mintive compared on sign-in, rules, logs and price.
- [Arcade vs Merge Agent Handler vs Composio for internal use](/blog/arcade-vs-merge-agent-handler-vs-composio/) — Arcade vs Merge Agent Handler vs Composio for internal company use: sign-in, connectors, audit, hosting and price, with Elaichi as the fourth option.
- [Best MCP platform for small and mid-size companies](/blog/mcp-platform-for-small-companies/) — Choosing an MCP platform for small and mid-size companies: what it needs, the cheapest billing at 50 and 200 seats, and when to buy nothing.