Is Composio secure enough for enterprise use?

The plain answer to "is Composio secure enough for enterprise use" is simple. Its own pages already list the controls most reviews ask about (composio.dev/enterprise, checked November 2026). A review still has to settle architecture. That means credentials, caller identity, the audit record and the restriction model.

Composio's Enterprise page says a team sets the tools and connected accounts each session can use, with its access policies enforced when agents act. It traces tool calls to the user, connected account, action and outcome. Single sign-on runs over SAML and OIDC with Okta, Microsoft Entra ID and Google Workspace (composio.dev/enterprise, checked November 2026). Single sign-on (SSO) means people sign in through the identity provider you already run. MCP (Model Context Protocol) is the standard way an AI assistant calls tools in other apps. An endpoint is the one address an AI client connects to. A grant is the authorization one person holds after approving a sign-in, and a restriction is a rule that blocks or allows connectors and tools.

Is Composio secure enough for enterprise use? Start with four mechanics

Four mechanics, and then the certifications behind them. Credentials, caller identity, the audit record and the restriction model decide whether a control list means anything inside your org chart. No vendor page settles those four for you.

Certifications sit behind the four rather than in front of them. AICPA frames a SOC 2 engagement as an examination of a service organization's description of its system and controls (AICPA SOC 2 guide). A Type II report adds testing over a stated period. Read the period end date and the exceptions the auditor noted. Check the systems named in scope, and the carve-outs for the cloud and logging vendors underneath.

Composio's MCP Gateway page states that Composio is SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001 certified (composio.dev/mcp-gateway, checked November 2026). That is Composio's own claim, so ask for the current report and read its scope under NDA. Elaichi's certifications and reports are published in its Trust Center. That page is the authority, not this one.

How do Composio and Elaichi compare on these mechanics?

Five rows, each one a question a reviewer has to answer anyway. The Composio column states only what Composio's own pages say, with the date each was checked. The Elaichi column states what the product does.

Where do connector credentials sit?

Outside Elaichi's main data. A separate credential service holds every connected account's secrets, encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The key can be rotated without re-encrypting older rows. Elaichi's own record carries ownership and lifecycle only. The secrets are fetched into memory for the one call that needs them.

Three details reviewers tend to probe. Connections created since 2026-10-05 have their credentials placed in the organization's region, with best-effort placement for APAC. Older ones are copied into the region when they are reconnected. A failed token refresh marks the connection needs_reauth rather than failing quietly at 3am. An organization can supply its own OAuth app per connector. The accepted fields are a client ID, a client secret and scopes. Nothing shaped like an endpoint can be written there. In Elaichi, customer-managed keys in AWS KMS come with the Black plan.

Composio describes a comparable boundary on its own platform. Its Enterprise page says credentials are stored with AES-256 encryption and kept apart from the customer's application code and from the LLM context. On Composio Cloud, the default hosted deployment, Composio stores credentials and can decrypt them to authenticate provider requests (composio.dev/enterprise, checked November 2026). Customer-managed keys are listed at its Enterprise tier (composio.dev/pricing, checked November 2026).

Who does each tool call run as?

The person whose grant the client is using. Elaichi serves MCP at one address, https://api.elaichi.ai/mcp, the same string for every organization. Which organization and which person a client reaches comes from the OAuth grant behind its token, not from the URL. Each member connects their client once and approves their own grant in a browser.

Every request re-reads that grant. Revoking it stops the client on its next call, and removing or suspending a member does the same. Permissions are read from the member's current role on each request, not stored in the token. A role change therefore applies before the token expires.

Which account the other app sees depends on the connection, not on the caller. Tools that should act as the person run on that person's own connections. A connection shared with a team runs every call on its owner's account. The audit record names the account the call actually reached.

An admin publishes the one address wherever the client allows it. On Claude Team and Enterprise, an owner adds it under Organization settings > Connectors. Members then connect it themselves (Anthropic's connector guide, checked October 2026). ChatGPT's full MCP support, write actions included, is available on Business, Enterprise and Edu (OpenAI's help article, checked October 2026). The steps are in connecting Elaichi to ChatGPT.

Composio's MCP Gateway page gives each team its own MCP endpoint, scoped to the tools that team is permitted to use. SSO verifies the user before any tool resolves (composio.dev/mcp-gateway, checked November 2026). Put the operational question to any per-team address model. Ask who publishes and rotates forty addresses, and what happens to a team's address when two teams merge.

What does the audit log record?

Who did what, through which account, and whether it worked. Elaichi writes one entry for each connected-tool call that reaches execution (a call refused earlier writes none). For arguments, the record holds the one path argument that names the object, as the target id, and nothing else about the arguments.

In Elaichi, a call from an MCP client is recorded under the person who signed in, with surface mcp and the OAuth client named. The OAuth client is recorded by its id. The actor kind ai_assistant marks only the Elaichi Agent, so a remote client is never mislabeled as one. A call refused at the scope check writes no entry, because nothing ran.

Every member can read the audit log: their own events, plus events on connections they own or can edit. The audit:view permission opens the whole organization. The free read-only Auditor role holds it, so a compliance reviewer takes no billable seat. Elaichi keeps 90 days of audit history. For a longer history, forward events to your own log service. Note that export to your own Datadog comes with the Black plan. Datadog is the destination that delivers.

Composio's MCP Gateway page says tool-call payloads are not stored, and that audit records hold metadata instead. The retention window is configurable from 7 days to 1 year (composio.dev/mcp-gateway, checked November 2026).

What can an admin restrict?

Connectors and tools, for a role or for one member. Elaichi keeps three layers apart on purpose. Roles bundle 58 permissions into personas, and a member holds exactly one role. Sharing is a separate grant of view, use or edit on a single connection, toolbox, template or connector. Restrictions decide which connectors and which individual tools a target may reach.

In Elaichi, restriction targets are role or user only; the organization default is the absence of a rule, which means allow everything. A rule aimed at a member can only narrow what their role allows, and never replaces or loosens a role rule. Within each layer, blocks always beat allows. Note that the allowlist stage engages on the presence of an allow rule, not its contents, so an allow rule that names nothing denies everything.

One mechanic belongs in the review file word for word. A block matches the tool's advertised name or the operation recorded when the rule was written; an allow matches that operation only. Whoever maintains a connector's documentation can rename a tool, so governance binds the operation and never the label. The reasoning is set out in why a block matches the name and an allow matches the operation.

Enforcement runs through the same resolver at every place a member can reach a connector or tool, including listing, connecting, advertising, executing, the final outbound-request check and opening a stored tool file. A role change or a restriction change takes effect within about two minutes. Grant revocation, member removal and suspension are effective on the next call. The tool:execute permission gates the endpoint ahead of every scope. Guest, Billing Admin and Auditor lack it, so their tool list is empty.

What the model sees is narrower than the catalog. In Elaichi, connected tools are never listed one by one, however few there are. A restricted tool is left out of the tools Elaichi offers a client and cannot be called. Search still names it, flagged restricted, with no schema. Frozen parameters pin an argument on calls that run through a toolbox entry. The model can see that a value is set, and often what it is. It cannot change it.

What happens when somebody leaves?

A preflight runs first, then one removal ends their access on the next call. The preflight lists every connection the departing member owns, plus their toolboxes, templates, synthetic tools and custom connectors. It also lists the toolbox entries elsewhere that rely on them. A private connection that a shared toolbox depends on blocks the removal. An admin transfers it to another active member, or deletes it.

Removal revokes that person's MCP grants and API tokens in the organization. It does not deprovision their accounts in the connected apps. Those are closed in each app, or through the identity provider. The contractor case is worked through in offboarding when an agent holds the access.

What does Elaichi not claim?

Two things, stated plainly, because a review will find them anyway. The prompt-injection write gate lives in the Elaichi agent window and does not apply to a raw tool call. An MCP server never receives the person's own prompt, so no gate of that kind can sit on the endpoint. Four things do hold there: a role check per operation, the forbidden classification no OAuth scope reaches, scope limits, and secret scrubbing in results. Every call that reaches execution also writes an audit row.

The second is total erasure. Deleting an organization deletes its connector credentials, and the audit history, usage analytics and some connector configuration records stay behind. Elaichi names that residue when the deletion completes rather than claiming everything is gone.

What to ask Composio's security team

Six questions, each one a gap that a published control list leaves open. Send them with the questionnaire rather than after it.

1. Report scope and period. Composio's MCP Gateway page states that Composio is SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001 certified (composio.dev/mcp-gateway, checked November 2026). Ask which systems are in scope, what period the Type II report covers, which exceptions the auditor noted, and which subservice organizations are carved out.
2. Where credentials are stored. The Enterprise page says credentials are stored with AES-256 encryption, and that on Composio Cloud Composio stores them and can decrypt them to authenticate provider requests (composio.dev/enterprise, checked November 2026). Ask whether any deployment exists in which Composio cannot decrypt them, and what customer-managed keys at the Enterprise tier change about that answer (composio.dev/pricing, checked November 2026).
3. Per-user or shared auth. The homepage says Composio Platform supports per-user connected accounts for agents, backend jobs and application-owned tools (composio.dev, checked November 2026). Ask which connections in your own setup would be per user and which shared, whose account the third-party app sees on a shared one, and what happens to it when its owner leaves.
4. Audit fields and retention. The MCP Gateway page says records hold the user, team, tool, action and outcome, that payloads are not stored, and that retention runs from 7 days to 1 year (composio.dev/mcp-gateway, checked November 2026). Ask for a sample record, and ask how it is exported to the log service you already run.
5. Data residency. The Enterprise page offers self-hosting at the Enterprise tier (composio.dev/enterprise, checked November 2026). Ask where tool calls execute on the hosted service, where audit records are stored, whether a region can be pinned, and what self-hosting covers and what it does not.
6. Incident notice. Ask the notification window after a confirmed incident, who is contacted on your side, and the steps that revoke a compromised connected account.

Send the same six to Elaichi. Four of the answers are in the sections above. On residency, Elaichi has three regions, EU, US and APAC, chosen when an organization is created. An EU or US organization's data store is pinned to that jurisdiction. APAC uses best-effort placement, which is not a residency guarantee. The certifications are in the Trust Center.

Where is Composio the better fit, and where is neither needed?

Composio is built for developers shipping agent products as much as for people connecting an assistant to their own apps. Its homepage speaks to both audiences. It says Composio Platform supports per-user connected accounts for agents, backend jobs and application-owned tools, and that when Composio is built into your agent, "Your users connect their own accounts, and Composio runs every call" (composio.dev, checked November 2026). If each of your customers' users needs their own authorized session, that page was written for you.

The other honest answer is neither. Eight people, one connected app, one AI client and a named owner do not need a governance layer yet. That case is argued in when a gateway is premature.

For a side-by-side view of the two vendors, read Elaichi and Composio compared. To check which of your systems already has a connector, browse the connector catalog. If the rollout runs one department at a time, start from the team use cases. Gold lists at $15 per user per month in USD, or $10 per user per month billed annually, and every new workspace starts on a 14-day Black trial, no credit card to start. Buying Gold or Black during the trial keeps its remaining days rather than granting a fresh 14, so it is one continuous trial, and the seats are first charged when it ends. A workspace that buys nothing moves to the free Personal plan. Pricing shows the local price where one applies.