Why people search for natoma alternatives
The situation is usually the same. Someone in IT has been asked to give the company's employees AI access to the apps they already use, across more than one client. Claude is already in the marketing team, ChatGPT is in finance, and engineering has Cursor. Somebody found Natoma, read its documentation, and now wants a second and third option before signing anything. That search for natoma alternatives is a shortlist problem, not a product problem.
The shortlist is harder than it looks because the category uses one word for several different shapes. A tool that proxies MCP servers your team already runs is a different purchase from a tool that brings its own connector catalog. Both get called a gateway. Before comparing vendors, it helps to read the four shapes an MCP gateway takes and work out which one your company actually needs.
MCP is the Model Context Protocol, the way an AI client such as Claude asks a server what tools exist and then calls one.
What does Natoma say its product does?
Natoma's own documentation describes Agent Access as helping an organization connect AI to key business applications using protocols such as MCP (docs.natoma.ai, checked October 2026). That is the vendor's own framing, and it is the only framing worth quoting.
Four things on Natoma's pages matter for a comparison. Its Core Concepts page names two connection types. Managed Connections are created and maintained by administrators; Personal Connections are enabled by admins but configured by end users (docs.natoma.ai, checked October 2026). Its Profiles page describes a Profile as a named collection of MCP server connections that you define once and distribute to users (docs.natoma.ai, checked October 2026). Its Granular Access Control page describes two policy types, Access Control and Content Validation, which can target identity provider groups. The same page states that until the first policy is created for an app, all tool calls will be allowed (docs.natoma.ai, checked October 2026). Its Monitor AI page says Natoma logs all activity taken by AI, including the initiating user, the LLM and the tool called (docs.natoma.ai, checked October 2026).
One more detail belongs on the shortlist spreadsheet. Natoma's Enterprise Capabilities page says the features listed there are only available to paying customers. Its Monitor AI, Granular Access Control and Secure Access to Natoma pages each sit under that heading (docs.natoma.ai, checked October 2026). Which plan carries which control is a question for the vendor's sales team. Ask it of every name on your list.
Natoma also documents a Custom Apps path. It can take a repository with an MCP server's source, a remote URL for an MCP server, or an API specification to generate one from (docs.natoma.ai, checked October 2026).
Two other names that land on the same shortlist
Composio and Zapier MCP both describe themselves on their own pages; the two differ most on how they bill and how a person is identified.
Composio's MCP Gateway page gives each team its own MCP endpoint, one URL per team, scoped to the tools that team is permitted to use. SSO verifies the user before any tool resolves (composio.dev, checked October 2026). Its Enterprise page says admins set permissions per user and per role, down to a single action. The same page says each tool call is logged with the user, team, tool, action and outcome (composio.dev, checked October 2026).
Zapier takes a different shape. Zapier's documentation gives each MCP client its own MCP server on the person's Zapier account, while every client connects to the same endpoint (docs.zapier.com, checked October 2026). Zapier's security page says app and action restrictions are not currently configurable for Zapier MCP alone, so a restriction applies account-wide across Zapier features. The same page says administrators using Zapier Workspaces can allow and restrict Zapier MCP for specific users by workspace membership (docs.zapier.com, checked October 2026).
The four things to compare
Most shortlists in this category collapse into four questions. Ask each one of every vendor, including Elaichi. The table sets out where the four names on this page stand.
| Connectors | Sign-in | Restrictions | Audit record | Hosting | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Natoma | Managed and personal connections; custom apps from source, a remote URL or an API spec | Managed connections by admins; personal connections by each user | Access Control and Content Validation policies, targetable at IdP groups | Initiating user or agent, LLM, tool called | Not on the pages we checked |
| Composio | 1,500+ managed app integrations, plus custom MCP servers | SSO verifies the user before a tool resolves | Per user and per role, down to a single action | User, team, tool, action, outcome; payload retention configured per project (Enterprise page) | Composio Cloud, customer VPC, or self-hosted |
| Zapier MCP | Zapier-owned tools across its app catalog | OAuth from the client, or a connection token | Not configurable for MCP alone; a restriction applies account-wide. Workspaces can restrict MCP to specific users by workspace membership | Tool calls per user in the History tab | Zapier-hosted; data in AWS US-East 1 |
| Elaichi | 650+ connectors: mostly Elaichi's own, plus native MCP connectors and your own remote MCP server on Gold | Each person approves their own OAuth grant at one address | Role or one member; whole connectors or single tools | Person, toolbox, tool, connector, connection, approval, surface, outcome | Hosted; EU, US and APAC regions |
The Natoma cells come from docs.natoma.ai: Core Concepts, Custom Apps, Granular Access Control and Monitor AI, each checked October 2026. The Composio cells come from composio.dev/mcp-gateway and composio.dev/enterprise, checked October 2026. The Zapier cells come from how connections work and Zapier MCP security, checked October 2026.
Where do the connectors come from? A platform either writes and runs its own connectors, routes you to a vendor's own MCP server, or proxies servers your team already runs. Some do a mix. This changes who you call when a tool breaks, and running each vendor's own server is its own trade against one plane. Elaichi's catalog holds two kinds of connector. Most are connectors Elaichi authors and runs itself. The rest are native MCP connectors, each one a vendor's own server with Elaichi's sign-in, rules and audit log in front. An organization on the Gold plan can also add its own remote MCP server as a connector.
Does each person sign in as themselves? This is the question that decides whether your audit log is worth reading. If ten people share one connection to Salesforce, every call looks the same in both Salesforce and your gateway. In Elaichi, each person connects their AI client once and approves their own OAuth grant, and every MCP request re-reads it. An OAuth grant is the standing permission a person gives one named client on Elaichi's consent screen.
Can a restriction reach one tool, not just one app? Blocking an app whole is easy. The real work is letting a support team read Stripe charges while blocking the refund tool. Elaichi's restrictions target a role or one member, name whole connectors or single tools, and are checked before a call leaves Elaichi. If you want the mechanics, restrictions, roles and sharing are three separate layers.
What does one audit row actually hold? Not whether there is an audit log; every vendor has one. Ask which fields a single tool-call row carries, and whether a failed or refused call writes one. What an AI agent audit log must capture sets out the fields worth insisting on.
How Elaichi answers those four questions
Elaichi is a governed MCP control plane. Every organization uses the same endpoint, https://api.elaichi.ai/mcp. The OAuth grant behind a client's token decides which organization, which person and which tools it reaches. There is no per-user, per-team or per-client address to generate or revoke.
On connectors, the catalog holds 650+ connectors. Elaichi authors and runs most of them. It governs vendors' own MCP servers for the rest, and lets a team bring its own remote MCP server under the same rules.
On identity, each person connects their client and approves their own grant on Elaichi's consent screen. That screen asks which organization the grant covers, which scopes it carries, and, when the person ticks "Run your connected tools", which toolboxes it reaches. A grant covers exactly one organization, and reaching a second takes a new connection.
On restrictions, a rule targets a role or one member and names whole connectors or single tools. Block and allow rules find their tool differently, which why a block and an allow match differently explains. In Elaichi, restriction targets are role or user only; the organization default is the absence of a rule, which means allow everything.
On audit, Elaichi keeps one entry for each connected-tool call that reaches execution (a call refused earlier writes none). Each row names the person, the connection the call reached and the MCP client; what an AI agent audit log must capture lists the other fields. A restriction or a missing scope refuses a call before that point, so it writes no row.
Where Elaichi is the wrong answer
Three cases, stated plainly.
Some companies run several MCP servers of their own. If the problem is putting one authenticated door in front of them, a proxy-shaped gateway is closer to the job. Elaichi can carry a remote MCP server as a connector on Gold, but the catalog is the reason to buy it. Count your servers before you shop.
If your requirement is that nothing leaves your own infrastructure, Elaichi does not meet it. Elaichi is hosted. Regions are EU, US and APAC, chosen when the organization is created. An EU or US organization's data store is pinned to that jurisdiction; APAC is best-effort placement, not a residency guarantee. Stored tool files go to the EU for every organization, whatever the region. Every organization's audit trail is stored in one EU instance, as the privacy policy states. If that is not acceptable, say so early.
If five people use one app each and nobody is asking who did what, you do not need any of these products yet. There is an honest version of that answer.
Questions to put to every vendor on your list
Take these to the demo, including ours.
When somebody leaves, what single action ends their AI access, and what does it not touch? In Elaichi, removing a member revokes every MCP OAuth grant and API token they hold in that organization. Their clients fail on the next call. It does not deprovision their accounts in the connected apps; that still happens in each app or through your identity provider. Toolbox entries the departing member pinned stop resolving until someone re-pins them.
How long does a permission change take to apply? In Elaichi, role, team, restriction and grant changes take effect about two minutes. Grant revocation, member removal and suspension are effective on the next call. In Elaichi, revoking a share or disconnecting an account takes effect on the caller's next call. Get a number from each vendor rather than the word "immediately".
Can the AI approve its own request? In Elaichi, only a person signed in to the console can approve or deny an access request, under Governance, then Access requests. No AI surface can decide one.
What does the plan actually include? Elaichi has two plans, Gold and Black, and both are paid. Gold lists at $15 per user per month in USD, or $10 per user per month billed annually. It includes the MCP endpoint, custom roles, restrictions, synthetic tools, custom connectors, SSO and SCIM. Elaichi also offers the Black plan, which is launching soon. See /pricing/ for the price in your own currency.
For the wider shortlist, the buyer's guide for IT teams walks the evaluation end to end, and the connector catalog shows what is already covered.
